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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Assessing the Effectiveness of Maritime Centres in
the Context of the Implementation of the Code of
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy,
Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime
Activity in West and Central Africa
(Yaoundé Code of Conduct)

Degree:

Master of Science

The dissertation is a study conducted to assess the capability level of Maritime
Centres in the Gulf of Guinea in the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct. The literature attained in this study indicates the Yaoundé Code of Conduct
is being implemented with several achievements attained, however, limitations exist
in the capabilities of signatories and Maritime Centres of the Gulf of Guinea region.
To obtain a deeper understanding of the study, a qualitative research approach was
employed through interviews of naval officers and other staff in the Maritime
Centres to explore the capabilities of Maritime Centres and how the Yaoundé Code
of Conduct is being implemented with these capabilities.
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Yaoundé Architecture were examined by
analysing some articles and the structure to realize how effective and smooth the
Code for suppressing maritime insecurity is being employed. The information on
capabilities and level of implementation obtained, identified limited resources in
logistics, finance and humans for Maritime Centres to effectively implement the
Code of Conduct.
Stakeholders both at the regional and international level are greatly supporting
Maritime Centres with resources, training for capacity building and joint operations
which is boosting the level of security in the region.
The study concludes by establishing the existence of limited capabilities in the
implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct by Maritime Centres and
recommends signatories and the regional economic communities to build the
capabilities of Maritime Centres for effective response to maritime insecurity in the
region.
KEYWORDS: Yaoundé Code of Conduct, Djibouti Code of Conduct,
Capabilities, Implementation, Challenges, Efficiency
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is an issue of concern to states in
the region. The region is located in the Atlantic Ocean, on the western coast of
Africa, and is known as the Earth’s Centre geographically. The region consists of 19
coastal states, namely Angola, Benin, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of the
Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Senegal and
Togo (Mbekeani & Ncube, 2011). It is rich in natural resources such as oil and fish,
attracting many maritime stakeholders, especially fishing vessels, shipping
companies, and offshore companies. The absence of some of these resources in other
regions has brought about illegal activities such as illegal unreported unregulated
fishing, illegal bunkering, piracy, and illegal trafficking in the region (Abudu, 2021).
Essentially, the lofty development potential of oil and gas in the ocean of coastal
states in the region, the region’s nearness to European and North American markets,
the continuous pressures between the Russian Federation and the European Union
(EU) member-states, the political precariousness within the Middle East and the
growing demand for fossil fuels in developing nations contribute to the heightened
geostrategic significance of the GoG's maritime space (Nwangwu, 2015). It is opined
that stopping criminals in the open water, starts with looking along the maritime
borders (Africa Defense Forum, 2020). Criminals could flee into another country’s
waters if confronted. Historically, this has been the space where traffickers, pirates,
and illegal fishermen felt safe. As quoted by Senior Capt. Boniface Konan of the
Cote d’Ivoire Navy, “that is the whole business of the bad guys. Even if you look on
the Automatic Identification System, you will see these groupings right there on the
borderline of each country”. Even though these acts occur often at sea, their
beginnings are land-based (Africa Defense Forum, 2020).
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Seemingly, the GoG region has become Africa’s foremost perilous maritime zone.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recognizes the GoG as one of the major
regions that endure robbery; the others are the Gulf of Aden and South East Asia
(Abdel Fattah, 2017).
The state of maritime insecurity in the region caused the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to assemble in June
2013 at a summit to discuss the issues of maritime insecurity in the region. The
summit lead to the signing of some key documents which includes the Code of
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and
Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, which is referred to as the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC). After the adoption of the Code, it has since been
in use to suppress armed robbery, piracy, and all illicit maritime activities in West
and Central Africa against ships (International Crisis Group, 2014). Further
discussions will be made about the Code in subsequent chapters.

Ensuring maritime security by implementing the Code as stated in the previous
paragraph cannot be done in isolation; hence, the signing of the Code laid out an
Architecture for maritime safety and security in the GoG. The Architecture is known
as the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security (YAMSS). Chapter 4
describes the Architecture in detail. The Architecture is illustrated in figure 1.
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Figure 1. Map of the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security

Note. From “An Architecture of Trust. The Security Structure of the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct is taking Shape in the Gulf of Guinea,” by Africa Defense Forum, 2020.
https://adf-magazine.com/2020/03/an-architecture-of-trust/.

The Architecture strives for information sharing, coordination of action,
strengthening laws, and eliminating areas of vulnerability which would aid in
disseminating information between all stakeholders. The Architecture includes one
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Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), two Regional Centres, and five
Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCC) coordinating the activities of
the respective Maritime Zones and the respective Maritime Operational Centres
(MOC) of navies in various states. The Yaoundé Architecture watches over 6000 km
of coastline and twelve significant ports of signatories to ensure the successful
implementation of the Code (Africa Defense Forum, 2020).
The ICC was created by the ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC to oversee the
implementation of the Code. The ICC coordinates the interregional efforts of the two
Regional Maritime Security Centres, the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in
Central Africa (CRESMAC) based in Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo, and the
Regional Centre for Maritime Security in West Africa (CRESMAO) based in
Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The ICC is in charge of the international coordination for
maritime security in the GoG (Bell, 2020).
The coastal space of the Regional Centres has been further divided into operational
Maritime Zones which have been designated by letters. The activities of these
Maritime Zones are coordinated by Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres
(MMCCs). The Architecture has ensured a strong connection between the various
Maritime Centres encouraging collective working to ensure maritime safety and
security in the GoG (Africa Defense Forum, 2020). Further details of the Yaoundé
Architecture would be made in chapter four.
For effective implementation of the Code, a strong Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) is required. Maritime Domain Awareness is the ability of signatories and
Maritime Centres to gather, process, analyse and effectively share information in
real-time about issues happening at sea (Bell, 2020).

Several authors such as Nwangwu (2015), Africa Defense Forum (2020), and Yücel
(2021) have discussed the implementation of the Code by its signatories especially in
combating piracy with several successes being achieved. However, the capabilities of
the interregional, regional and multinational Maritime Centres in the implementation
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of the Code have not been researched. Siebels (2020) indicates that the number of
recorded

piracy

occurrences

faces

underreporting

implying

that

official

measurements may not reflect realities. As the issue of underreporting is being
decreased, an increment within the factual occurrence rate may not reflect a genuine
or unrestrained increment in assaults. Altogether, current patterns suggest that
assaults are getting to be more advanced.
1.2 Problem Statement
The predominance of robbery and maritime theft against ships within the GoG is a
major issue for coastal states. The danger has threatened sea trade within the brief
term and the stability of coastal states’ security within the long term, compromising
the advancement of the geostrategic financial assets of the region. The Yaoundé
Architecture consists of autonomous states that are reluctant to delegate sovereignty
but are obliged to collaborate because blue crime is innately transnational and thus
requires coordinated responses (Hamad, 2021).
The challenge that comes with the repressive measures adopted in the Code of June
2013 relative to piracy and troubles at sea is that specific literature is fragmentary.
No systematic effort has been committed to assessing how the Maritime Centres
across the region function as a unit in the implementation of the Code.
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The establishment of Maritime Centres is to aid in the operationalization of the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct to combat maritime insecurity in the GoG region.
Unfortunately, the capabilities of Maritime Centres are not adequate in the
implementation of the Code.
In this regard, the research would explore the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to reveal its
expected outcome. The study further aims to present and evaluate the capabilities of
Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code.
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1.4 Research Questions
To achieve the aim and objectives of the research, the following questions would be
looked at;
1. How does the Code intend to deal with the issue of maritime insecurity in the
Gulf of Guinea?
2. What is the current state of capabilities of the Yaoundé Architecture
Maritime Centres?
3. How efficient are these capabilities in the implementation of the Code?

1.5 Ethical Considerations
The researcher upheld ethical considerations in the study. All external information
required from interviews during the research was approved by the World Maritime
University (WMU) Research Ethics Committee before seeking them.

The process for the selection of participants for the study and how the data was
collected is described in detail in chapter 5. Also, appendix A contains the guided
questions used for the interview. Such information would be kept under a strong
password and will be discarded properly after the research, with all confidentiality
maintained. After considering the ethical requirements for the research, let’s take a
look at the limitations the researcher encountered.
1.6 Limitations
A limitation in literature and statistics exit in the area of research. Also, confidential
information exists and attaining such data might be a challenge. This is due to the
level of security involved in the study.

The information used for the research was mainly based on primary data collected
through interviews. The researcher intended to interview a minimum of twenty staff
from the various Maritime Centres, however, due to the lack of required staff and the
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fact that some Maritime Centres were not in operation, the researcher was limited in
the number of respondents. Despite the limitations, the structure of the research is
explained below.

1.7 Structure of Dissertation
The research is in nine chapters. Chapter one gives a background of maritime
insecurity in the GoG region. It provides measures taken by stakeholders of the
region in combating the insecurity and further reviews the Yaoundé Architecture’s
adoption of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. This chapter established research
questions to achieve the research aim and objectives. The chapter addresses ethical
considerations and limitations of the research and ends with the structure of the
study.

Chapters two, three and four reviewed some literature on maritime insecurity in the
GoG. Causes of insecurity in the region were stated with international and regional
actions taken to address the situation. A further overview was conducted on the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the structure of the Yaoundé Architecture for
Maritime Safety and Security.

Chapter five gives details of the research methodology used by the researcher to
achieve the desired aim of the research. Reasons for the choice of the method were
provided and the process of data collection was described in detail.

Chapter six deals with the capabilities of Maritime Centres in Yaoundé Architecture
and how the capabilities are being used for effective implementation. Details of the
current capabilities of Maritime Centres are provided in the chapter.

Chapter seven concentrates on the efficiency of Maritime Centres in implementing
the Code. It states the level of implementation and how effective the Code is being
employed.

7

Chapter eight provides a comparison of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the
Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCC), stating the similarities and differences that exist
between them and chapter nine gives a summary of the study conducted, conclusion
and recommendations to better Maritime Centres in implementing the Code. The
structure of the study aims at the results in the next paragraph.
1.8 Expected Results
At the end of this research, the following results are expected:
1. A detailed analysis and understanding of the Yaoundé Code, stating how
Maritime Centres are helping to implement it.
2. Recommend measures for the implementation of the Code by Maritime
Centres considering capabilities, communication, and interconnection.
3. A comparative analysis of the Yaoundé Code and the Djibouti Code for
making recommendations.
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Chapter 2. Maritime Insecurity in the GoG
2.1 Background
It has been more than a couple of decades since the problem of transnational
organised crimes at sea has received some form of attention (Bueger & Edmunds,
2020). These crimes, referred to as “blue crimes” in some corridors transcend
maritime domains into terrestrial spaces. Their ripple effects are not just affecting the
ships, companies that own them, or even nations in whose waters these happen but
also affecting national and regional security.

These crimes include environmental crimes, human, narcotics, arms and light
weapons trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea coupled with territorial crimes
that breach rules and laws governing territories and jurisdictions of states in the GoG.
These crimes are committed by persons and organized networks that often cross
borders of one state’s territory and in this sense, are transnational (Hastings, 2012).
As the GoG reigns at the top of transnational organized crime and piracy, a detailed
understanding of the dynamics in the mix of activities that borders on maritime
security is key to the success of the Yaoundé Code.

The GoG has remained in the most important regions in global commerce. This can
be linked to the availability of high-profile resources like gold, diamonds, and the
palpable potential of oil and gas (Ezeozue, 2019). The region’s proximity to North
America and Europe and the growing demand for fossil fuels in developing countries
contribute to the increased importance of the regional maritime territories of the
GoG. However, there is growing concern about the undermining of the realisation of
the full potential of the GoG due to international, regional, and domestic threats and
vulnerabilities (Makarenko, 2004). Instead of the countries in this region prospering
from the resources they possess collectively, the pervasive incidence of insecurity
significantly constrains investments and economic prospects. This has partly resulted

9

in the expansion of organized crimes and terrorism with potential adverse political
effects leading to more than US$2 billion in annual losses (Gilpin, 2007).

Some of the crimes in the GoG maritime domain are highlighted in Article 1 (5) of
the Yaoundé Code. One can correlate the increase in crimes in the GoG to the
decrease in piracy off the coast of Somalia which used to top the charts but has seen
a decline in the presence of massive deployment of international naval forces
(Ezeozue, 2019).

2.2 Maritime Insecurity Incidents in the GoG
Maritime insecurity according to Bueger (2015) are threats such as maritime interstate disputes, trafficking of narcotics, people, and illicit goods, arms proliferation,
illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, piracy or maritime accidents, environmental
crimes and disasters. Overall, maritime safety covers the protection of ports, ships,
and their communities against accidental dangers and harms (eg. sea storms) whereas
per Bueger’s definition, maritime security deals with the protection of the same but
this time against deliberate dangers and harms (eg. piracy). This clarifies what is
qualified as an insecurity incident. With a focus on the GoG, reports of armed
robbery among other crimes occur and are readily reported and documented.
Generally, blue crimes appear to be on the rise judging by recent headlines with
regards to piracy especially. But these interpretations and the data they depend on
must be looked at with care. Figures on piracy and armed robbery at sea are prone to
over and underreporting and also have challenges with their definition (Bueger &
Edmunds, 2020). According to the IMB, various attacks were documented in 15
littoral states in the GoG in the past three years. The IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre
(IMB PRC) recorded 84 attempted and successful attacks in 2020. In 2019, they
recorded 64 incidents relative to 82 incidents in 2018 which are close to the 2020
figure. Most of these attacks were reported to have targeted crew members for
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ransom. Reportedly, the region is said to be a site for over 90% of the world’s
kidnappings at sea (IMB, 2022).

The number of crew members seized within the GoG expanded more than 50% from
78 in 2018 to 121 in 2019. This compares to over 90% of worldwide kidnappings
reported at sea with 64 kidnapped crew members across six isolated incidents within
the final quarter of 2019 alone. The region accounted for 64 cases counting all four
vessel hijackings that happened in 2019, as well as 10 out of 11 vessels that came
under fire (IMB, 2020).

The IMB PRC follows the definitions of Piracy as defined in Article 101 of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Armed
Robbery as defined by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in its 26 th
Assembly session as Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of Practice for the
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” (IMB,
2020).
Article 101 of UNCLOS defines Piracy as:
(a)

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,

committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii)

against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the

jurisdiction of any State;
(b)

any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft

with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
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(c)

any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in

subparagraph (a) or (b).
IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” defines Armed Robbery as
1.

any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat

thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed
against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s
internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
2.

any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above

(IMO, 2005).
Reports from the IMB, as well as the ICC in Yaoundé greatly influence public and
policy discourse. In West and Central Africa, this discourse on the state of maritime
security relying on these numbers alone may be disputed and thus must be carefully
examined to avoid gaps and pitfalls.
For instance, the Nigerian Navy reports 339 incidents of piratical attacks in 2020.
But subjecting these to the definitions under international law, 214 of the 339
representing 63.13% of the reported figure would qualify as a pirate attack. The rest
are acts of robbery since they took place in Nigerian territorial waters and not on the
high seas (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2021). Within 12 nautical miles of a state’s waters,
the responsibility lies on the littoral state to respond. The location of attacks is
significant for both interpreting the data and making responses referencing the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct (IMB, 2020).
The tables and figures below represent the data presented by the International
Maritime Bureau.
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Table 1: Locations of actual and attempted incidents, January - March 2018-2022
Locations - West and Central
Africa

2018

2019

Angola
Benin

5

1

Cameroon

1

1

2020

2021 2022

3

2

3

1

4

1

Dem. Republic of Congo

1

Dem. Rep. of Sao Tome &

1

4

1

2

Principe
Gabon
Ghana

1

Guinea

1

3

2

1

Cote D’Ivoire

1

Liberia

1

Nigeria

22

14

Togo

1

1

31

22

Subtotal

2

1

1

1
11

2

20

16

8

Adopted From “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period 1 January - 31 March 2022,”
by ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2022. https://www.icc
ccs.org/reports/Q1%202022%20IMB%20Piracy%20Report.pdf.
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2.3 Causes and Effects of Maritime Insecurity in the GoG
Transcribed into the original Latin form, “pirates” literally mean “enemies of
mankind”. By this, pirates are not enemies of one state but all states and become an
unparalleled, participatory security risk at the global level (Broohm, 2021). Maritime
crime off the coast of West and Central Africa has risen to a security threat level that
makes the region Africa’s current piracy hotspot (Teixeira & Pinto, 2022).

Nonetheless, there are underlying causes of these crimes. Their resultant effects,
some of which are not just felt by coastal communities but the globe over makes it
worth noting. Some of the root causes of blue crimes in the GoG are; Sea blindness,
governmental structuring, youth unemployment, political violence and electoral
uncertainty, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and corruption
which would be explained in subsequent paragraphs. Poor governance, lack of
significant economic prospects, and high depravity in the region obstruct the
effectiveness of trying to fight the menace allowing piracy to thrive. These adverse
activities result in increased maritime insurance costs, growth of regional ‘black
markets’, and higher global oil prices (Fiorelli, 2014).

Sea blindness as a concept is essential to the novelty of the study of maritime
security and is used to describe the general neglect of the importance of the sea. This
extends mainly to the political and scholarly class, as it manifests in ways where
even North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are guilty of not
modernising their navy and the general population is largely ignorant of their
dependence on the sea. This phenomenon indicates a much broader overview of the
importance of the sea at regional levels, from academics to policymakers, which in
turn allows blue crimes such as environmental degradation and fishery crimes to
thrive unbridled (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017).

The government structures that support institutions mandated to check these crimes
have a significant impact on the prevalence of piratical activity. Weakness in state
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institutions represents the most common explanation for maritime piracy. There are
some forms of disagreement as to the exact level at which this weakness leads to the
rate at which these crimes are committed. A simple regional analysis has shown that
fiscal decentralisation at a national level lowers the number of crimes. This is
because regions have larger stakes in the revenue streams that are realised from
peaceful settings. Weak states combine inadequate coastal security personnel, house
corrupt elites and ineffective courts. When this is allied to substantial unemployment
and inequality, a significant grievance is caused in the populace and facilitates the
creation of sanctuaries for criminal activity (Ofosu-Boateng, 2018).

Thirdly, youth joblessness is a well-known underlying factor of robbery in the GoG.
The connection of African youth joblessness to theft in Nigeria for example is
especially emphasised. While the adherence of aggrieved youth to robbery is having
an overflow impact on the overall space of the GoG and stays challenged, research
from Somalia shows that state-building isn't sufficient to deal with blue crimes in the
GoG. State-building alongside handling youth joblessness would assist to battle the
more extensive development of maritime crimes in the GoG (Kamal-Deen, 2017).

Political violence and piracy, by extrapolation and relating them to weakened states
share multiple similarities. Elections threaten to disrupt already cemented deals
between organised criminal enterprises and corrupt incumbent authorities. Hence, in
the heat of elections, albeit highly competitive ones, piratical attacks see an increase.
One may be due to the uncertainty caused by a potential change in regime, giving an
increased incentive to engage in crime before the instability caused by new
incumbents. The other may also be that these attacks are to display their influence on
the political elites, whose support they need to stabilise the environments in which
they operate (Allen, 2017).

A state's ineptitude to keep up with command over its regional waters can prompt
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, which sidesteps local fishermen
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who may thus turn to crime, including theft. In the Somalian case study, after the
breakdown of its government foundations in the mid-1990s, unfamiliar commercial
fishing vessels started fishing off the Somalia shore, attacking its regional waters and
getting about three times as much fish stock as possible, an endeavour that has
demonstrated to be a liberally productive option in contrast to legitimate fishing. This
unrestrained double-dealing harms biological systems and local fishermen and, as
displayed in Somalia, causes financial hardships that drive numerous Somalis into
the positions of Piracy organizations (Mansaray, 2017). This way, fisher folks stand a
chance to procure a few thousand US dollars from a solitary privateer assault, a
significantly higher sum than would be conceivable by working hard for quite a long
time in the lawful economy.

Lastly, on the issue of corruption, a threat to democracy itself when powerful
individuals and organisations, particularly those allied to the security sectors utilise
positions to serve their benefits. Corrupt acts benefit a few at the cost of the integrity
of institutions and authorities or individuals in charge of protecting assets and
properties within the nation. These pervasive vices manifest in the matters of the sea
where records point to instances where the Nigerian navy is accused of oil bunkering
(Broohm, 2021).
2.4 Response to Maritime Insecurity in the GoG
Strategies to address insecurity in the GoG can be broken into three levels of
planning and/or implementation: national, regional, and international. Hasty
reactions could lead to narrow results that fail to solve the underlying causes of
maritime insecurity. Laws that will be effective far out at sea will be beyond the
capacity of most regional states alone. A solution will therefore have to be a
collective one requiring multinational support as prioritised in the Yaoundé Code
(Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2021). For example, in the Maritime Post, MV Rowayton
Eagle was attacked 200 nm off the coast of Accra, Ghana. On January 30th 2021,
this incident occurred around 0430 UTC and similar incidents further out at sea may
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not be uncommon (The Maritime Post, 2021). There is a possibility that ships on the
High Seas are the latest targets because coastal law enforcement is gaining ground
among the GoG states.

According to various authors, including Barrios (2013), Mandanda & Guo (2016),
Ofosu-Boateng (2018), and Vrey (2009) certain comparisons have been drawn
between piracy in the GoG and that of the coast of Somalia. There is a global debate
on solutions to maritime insecurity in the GoG as some shipping companies
operating in the GoG worry about their security provisions. Some even call for
greater international naval visibility and others demand armed private security
personnel on board. Even though the two areas of comparison, the Somalia region
and the GoG suffer piracy issues, they are distinct and policy responses needed for
impactful solutions must also be different. A clear case here is the consensus that
needs to be reached considering the littoral states in the GoG. Each member state will
need to accept and authorise the presence of a foreign naval vessel even if it is for
protection. However, the horn of Africa, having an enormous peninsula with Somalia
for example will not need the same requirements.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted anti-piracy resolutions for
both the Horn of Africa and the GoG in 2008 (Kamal-Deen, 2017; Anyimadu, 2013;
Fiorelli, 2014). These measures in the case of Somalia established links with the
recognised government to allow for foreign naval patrols. The latter prioritised
capacity building against those envisioned by ECOWAS and ECCAS under the
umbrella of the Yaoundé agreement.

Members proposed several activities which could be implemented by individual
nations to address the challenges posed by maritime insecurity. Such activities
incorporate endeavours to extend national attention to the sea space, as well as to
improve the training and equipment of the relevant security workforce. Battling blue
crimes requires reinforcing good governance and straightforwardness, especially
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concerning oil exploitation. Straightforward administration and impartial sharing of
oil reserves can help alleviate destitution. In addition, awareness-raising and the
approval and taming of international instruments on maritime security, counting the
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, can help reduce oceanic insecurity. In the local context, an
example is given in Nigeria where a task force brought together the army, navy, air
force, and mobile police in the Niger Delta in 2004 (Ezeozue, 2019). This was to
restore order and help guard against oil theft and illegal refineries. A campaign was
launched to sensitise the populace on the risk of using “blood” oil as they termed it.
A process that was costing Nigeria about 10% of its daily production and billions of
dollars yearly to the benefit of local and international syndicates (Asuni, 2009).

Delving into the main context of this paper which focuses on the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct in the West and Central African Sub-region, it becomes clear the steps to be
taken in advancing the successful implementation of the Code. The vulnerability of
vessels around the port is cited in the guidelines for shipping in the GoG, which
states: “The risk of falling victim of a pirate attack is particularly high when the ship
is at anchor or is drifting off a port”. While efforts are made to harden vessels to
reduce pirate attacks, preventing the vessels from being detected in the first place
will demand focusing on tackling criminals’ access to vital information about their
locations and cargoes. To the extent that some networks may even have information
on the type of security measures being undertaken on board a vessel. Thus it suggests
that stringent anti-corruption measures on land will be the best method to counter this
(Kamal-Deen & Benning, 2020).

ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC have cognisance of the policy lessons that can be
drawn from the counter-piracy efforts in Eastern Africa, the Djibouti Code (IMO,
2009). This can be said to be an influence behind the West Africa - focused code that
has been adopted by 25 states; the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
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Maritime security is important for economic growth, food security and reduction in
international crime. Those who take to illegalities at sea are very adaptive, sharply
sophisticated in their methods and often with good connections that give them vital
information (Anyimadu, 2013). Thus, local, regional and global efforts must be
proactive and flexible too. In a region where armies are generally prioritized over its
naval force, and where fisheries and aquatic ministers do not hold much political
power, the challenge for those in the maritime area is to ensure that international
partners and regional policymakers identify that greater security at sea in the GoG
brings prosperity to the region.
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Chapter 3. Overview of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct
3.1 Background
This chapter delves into the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as mentioned in chapter two.
The GoG region is one of the vital shipping routes for global trade. It is now a hot
spot for maritime insecurity. The region has seen a sharp rise in maritime insecurity,
especially piracy in the past few years. International trade on the sea has been
disrupted largely by the increase of piracy in the region (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

Maritime insecurity in the GoG has been declared a major threat to security and
economic stability in the region (Luntumbue, 2016). The issue of piracy worries the
global community and costs humans, the environment, politics and the economy. It
affects the peace and security of states and their economic development. This has
affected global interests and is now of concern to the international community. To
deal with the up rise of maritime insecurity in the region, an integrated approach was
considered to strengthen maritime security and address the primary causes which are
mostly economic, social and political factors. The urgent need for cooperation and
coordination in the region was required to help tackle maritime insecurity (Hassan &
Hasan, 2017). The West and Central Africa adopted an agreement known as the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct as mentioned earlier in chapter one on 19 March 2013 in
Cotonou (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Two other documents were adopted in addition to this Code of Conduct. They are the
ECCAS /ECOWAS Declaration of Heads of State and Government of Central and
West Africa States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime
Domain and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ECOWAS,
ECCAS and GGC on Maritime Security in West and Central Africa. These three
documents were endorsed on 25 June 2013 by all Heads of State and Government of
ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC in Yaoundé, Cameroon at the GoG Maritime Safety
and Security Summit (Egede, 2021). All three instruments constitute the foundations
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of a regional maritime security regime in the GoG and are known as the Yaoundé
Process (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The Yaoundé Process emanated after the West and Central African countries desired
to counter maritime crimes. The Code was established in agreement with the UNSC
Resolutions 2018 (October 2011) and 2039 (February 2012) which recognized the
need for a comprehensive approach to counter maritime insecurity; piracy and armed
robbery at sea in the GoG. The resolutions also highlight the need to build on
existing national, regional and extra-regional initiatives for maritime security in the
GoG since it would create opportunities for legally binding instruments (Sartre,
2014; Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

The June 2013 meeting in Yaoundé led to a strategy common to both the ECOWAS
and ECCAS regions which would be discussed in the next chapter. The Yaoundé
Code was greatly inspired by the Djibouti Code and forms the legal basis for the
cooperation of states in both the West and Central African regions. Details on
sharing of responsibilities, intervention and practical organization of the fight against
all maritime crimes in both regions are provided by the Code (Luntumbue, 2016).
The Code describes the intent of signatories to cooperate in curbing transnational
organized crime to their fullest capability (Yücel, 2021).

The Code does not only deal with piracy and armed robbery against ships but adopts
a multidimensional approach to maritime security by dealing with a wide range of
transnational organized crimes committed in the maritime domain (Egede, 2021).
After stating the approach adopted to ensure maritime security by the Code, some
principal features of the Code would be discussed.

3.2 Principal Features of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct
The Yaoundé Code incorporates several aspects of the Djibouti Code (Hassan &
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Hasan, 2017). The Yaoundé Code may be considered a relaxed international
instrument and not a treaty because the parties to the Code do not intend to make it
binding (Egede, 2021). Some of its features would be discussed in this section.
3.2.1

Non-binding Legal Instrument

The Yaoundé Code like the Djibouti Code is not a legally binding instrument. The
non-binding nature of the Yaoundé Code is confirmed in Article 17(a) which states
that, within three years of the Code being implemented, the Signatories would enter
into a binding multilateral treaty, at the invitation of the Inter-Regional Coordination
Centre but that has not been done.

The Code was not intended to be binding until a subsequent conversion. Also,
Article 19 (a) of the Code states that nothing in the code of conduct is intended to
create or establish a binding agreement.
3.2.2

Crimes

Additional to the non-binding nature, the Code does not only deal with piracy and
armed robbery at sea but includes all illicit maritime activities in its area of
application. The list of transnational organized crimes in the maritime domain is
provided in Article 1(5) of the Code.
The Code’s definition of piracy was adopted from UNCLOS and the Djibouti Code
while the definition of armed robbery against ships was derived from the IMO Code
of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships.
3.2.3

Cooperation of Signatories

Dealing with maritime crimes stated above requires cooperation. Signatories to the
Code have declared their intention to cooperate in all aspects to deal with the
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repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships, transnational crimes in the
maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea
stated in Article 2 of the Code.

To succeed, the Yaoundé Code adopted the principles of sharing and reporting
relevant information, interdicting ships engaged in transnational organized crime,
arresting and prosecuting those committing the crimes and care and treatment of the
victims from the Djibouti Code

3.2.4

Information Sharing Network

Cooperation goes with information sharing. Information sharing is encouraged by the
Yaoundé Code. Signatories to the Code are required to share information about any
maritime insecurity incident in the region; hence, the establishment of an
information-sharing network by the Yaoundé Architecture. The network focuses on
national focal points and piracy Information Sharing Centres (ISCs).

Focal points are to be declared by signatory states at the time of signing the Code or
as soon as possible as depicted in Article 11 of the Code. The ICC serves as the ISC
since no ISC was established under the Architecture. Uniform reporting criteria
ensure an accurate assessment of the threats of maritime insecurity in the region as
stated in Article 12 of the Code.
3.2.5

Prosecution and Conviction

Similar to information sharing, signatories to the Code are being encouraged in
Article 15 of the Code to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea in their
national laws to help in the effective interdiction, prosecution and conviction of
persons committing or attempting to commit any transnational crime.

The Code seeks to apprehend and prosecute such crimes in domestic courts.
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Furthermore, the Code requests countries to develop guidelines to enable them to
exercise jurisdiction, conduct investigations and prosecute alleged offenders.
3.2.6

Maritime Security Cooperation

Aside from prosecution and conviction, the development and promotion of training
and educational programs for the maintenance of safety and order at sea are
addressed in Article 14(1) of the Code. Signatories intend to foster cooperation
among maritime training institutions and research centres.

The exchange of naval and law enforcement personnel together with other experts is
required to acquire views on maritime insecurity issues. Additionally, Article 14(2)
of the Code encourages regular meetings to enhance cooperation and coordination in
maritime enforcement activities.
3.2.7

National Strategies

In addition to security cooperation discussed earlier, signatories to the Code are
urged to establish and implement appropriate national maritime security policies as
stated in Article 4(1) of the Code.

By doing this, sea trade would be safeguarded from all unlawful acts and also
provide security for port facilities and ships. Additionally, a maritime security
committee to coordinate activities is required and Article 4(2) of the Code
encourages it. Let us draw our attention to the provision made for the seizure of
pirate ships.
3.2.8

Seizure of Pirate Ships

Any pirate ship can be seized by any signatory of the Code outside the territorial sea
of another signatory. Also, persons and property on board may be seized according
to Article 6(1) of the Code. The provision in Article 3 gives seizing rights to
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warships or other ships that are clearly marked and easily identifiable as government
vessels.

The court of the seizing signatory may judge the pirates as well as decide what is to
be done with the property and ship as provided in Article 6(4) of the Code. The
Article continues to state that, the right may be granted to another signatory to the
Code to exercise jurisdiction. It is usually better to allow the state close to the
location of the incident to apply its national laws, however when it happens in the
territorial waters of a signatory, the signatory automatically exercises jurisdiction.
After considering the relevant features of the Code, it is appropriate to now examine
its effectiveness as a whole.
3.3 Effectiveness of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to Date
The principal features of the Yaoundé Code discussed earlier gives more attention to
aspects of national security and less to development and human security (Brits &
Nel, 2018). The Code serves as a step to ensuring regional maritime governance and
provides an effective model for regional cooperation. Additional elaboration is done
on the maritime security strategy that is common to the maritime domain of West
and Central Africa (Hassan & Hasan, 2017). Nonetheless, the restrictive focus of the
Code on national security does not provide a permanent solution to maritime
insecurity in the region (Brits & Nel, 2018). The possibilities of the use of the Code
are limited as it is not legally binding. The Code does not impose obligations to
signatories; hence, compliance with the code is based on the signatory’s will (Hassan
& Hasan, 2017).

Extensive assistance has been granted to the Code, however, the Code has had
limited impact on the prevention of transnational crimes. The naval patrols and
bilateral and multilateral operations that were intensified as a result of the Code were
effective in decreasing the severity but the issues persist (Brits & Nel, 2018).
Additionally, the Code says nothing about merchant ships’ protection at sea, for
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example, the use of armed guards. Security companies are dissatisfied as they had
expectations that the Code would state a provision for private guards in the territorial
sea of states (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).
Despite the limitations of the Yaoundé Code, the Code has the potential to tackle the
issues of maritime insecurity in the GoG if countries of the region cooperate and
coordinate their actions to implement it thoroughly. However, further analysis would
be carried out in the following chapters to assess if its intended purpose is being
achieved through its implementation and enforcement.
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Chapter 4. The Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and
Security
4.1 Rationale behind the Yaoundé Architecture
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct explained in the previous chapter cannot be
implemented without the Yaoundé Architecture. The idea of the Yaoundé Process
which includes the Yaoundé Code started after a former President of Benin,
President Yayi Boni requested from the United Nations (UN) assistance to fight
piracy in the region in 2011. The UNSC in response adopted the UNSC Resolution
2018. The resolution states the threat piracy and armed robbery at sea have posed to
security, international navigation and economic development in the region. Also, the
UNSC Resolution 2036 was adopted which urged states to develop frameworks for
effective cooperation and information (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

These UNSC resolutions were followed by the summit that led to the adoption of the
Yaoundé Process. After the summit, actions were taken by regional organizations to
aid in the implementation of the Yaoundé Process (Sartre, 2014). The ECOWAS,
ECCAS and GGC adopted an MoU and Political declaration aimed at organizing the
relationship between the regional maritime safety and security centres and also
confirming their political support (Luntumbue, 2016). Additionally, the ECOWAS
Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) was adopted and the ECOWAS, ECCAS and
GGC determined the roles of Maritime Centres (Sartre, 2014).

The ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC noticed the need for transnational cooperation as
it was the key to fighting transnational maritime crime in a communal sea (Yücel,
2021). The Yaoundé Code was the most comprehensive and led to the establishment
of a regional maritime-related security regime and corresponding architecture (Danso
& Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). It is now appropriate to study the structure of the
Architecture.
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4.2 The Structure of the Yaoundé Architecture
The Yaoundé Code recognizes the need for global, regional, sub-regional and
bilateral levels of cooperation to tackle the issue of maritime insecurity in the region.
Information sharing and communication between focal points of states and other
stakeholders in the maritime domain was acknowledged as an effective tool to resort
to. The implementation of the Code required an Architecture to ensure joint actions
at different levels to intervene in the maritime space of the region. The
comprehensive Architecture established for the Yaoundé Code consists of 4 levels of
actors; the strategic or political level, the regional level, the multinational level and
the national level with the political level being the highest (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe,
2021).

The political level consists of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); the
ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC (ICC, 2022). An Interregional Coordination Centre
on Maritime Safety and Security for Central and West Africa was created after the
Code was adopted. Its headquarters is in Yaoundé (Sartre, 2014). The ICC in
Yaoundé is at the strategic level. The Regional level constitutes the CRESMAC and
CRESMAO (ICC, 2022).

A Maritime Security Protocol was adopted by ECCAS in October 2009 and got
member states working together to enhance information sharing. The Protocol also
encouraged joint surveillance and patrols and ensured harmonization of the legal
frameworks. All member states ratified the Protocol giving political and legal
backing for implementation. A Maritime Security Structure was established for
ECCAS based on the Protocol. The structure includes the regional, zonal and
national Maritime Coordination Centres. The Regional Centre for Maritime Security
in Central Africa (CRESMAC) was established after a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between ECCAS Heads of States (Danso & AlloteyPappoe, 2021).
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The Maritime space of Central Africa was further divided into zones: Zone A,
Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zone D,
Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The Maritime
Coordination Centres for these Zones are in Luanda and Douala respectively (Bell,
2020).

To ensure better coordination to deal with maritime insecurity in the West Africa
region, ECOWAS adopted the EIMS after the Yaoundé Code was adopted. This was
to aid in the establishment of maritime security structures for easy coordination and
cooperation. Like the ECCAS, the Regional Centre for Maritime Security of West
Africa (CRESMAO) was instituted to effectively coordinate the Multinational
Maritime Coordinating Centres (MMCC) in the region. The coastal space was also
divided into three Maritime Zones. They are Zone E (Benin, Nigeria, Niger and
Togo), Zone F (Ghana, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Burkina Faso) and Zone G
(Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mali and Senegal). The respective MMCCs
are Cotonou, Accra and Praia (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

At the national level of the Architecture are Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs).
Maritime Operation Centres exist below the MMCCs. MOCs represent the Yaoundé
Architecture at the national level. They operate in signatory states and unite with the
navy to ensure coordination of the major stakeholders of the State’s action at sea
(Luntumbue, 2016). Figure 2 shows the structure of the Yaoundé Architecture.
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Figure 2. The Yaoundé Architecture and its levels of Operation

Note. From “Mapping Maritime Actors under the Yaoundé protocol: Establishing Mandates, Interrelationships,
Caps and Prospects”, by Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021. https://kaiptc-danishmaritimesecurityproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/11/Mapping-Maritime-Actors-under-the-Yaounde-Protocol.

4.3 Differentiation between Maritime Zones in the Yaoundé Architecture and
Maritime Zones of UNCLOS
The maritime zones of UNCLOS differ from that of the Yaoundé Architecture and
this chapter clarifies the difference. The maritime space of coastal states has been
divided into zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). This is to allow the sovereignty of states with the legal order which
would facilitate international communication and promote peace in the use of the
seas and the oceans. It will also help in the efficient utilization of maritime resources,
their conservation and protection. These zones under the UNCLOS are the territorial
sea, the contiguous zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (UNCLOS, 1982).

According to UNCLOS, the territorial sea of coastal states extends to 12 nautical
miles from its baselines. The sovereignty of the state covers the territorial sea as well
as the air space, sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea. In the territorial sea, ships
of all states have the right to enjoy an innocent passage without any permission. The
passage shall be continuous and expeditious and may include stopping and
anchoring. This is possible when it pertains to ordinary navigation, when in distress
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or assisting persons, ships or aircraft in danger. Any foreign ship exercising this right
is to comply with all laws and regulations regarding the innocent passage and coastal
states shall not hinder the innocent passage of these vessels. However, if any warship
refuses to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state in its territorial
sea and disregards its request for compliance, the coastal state may require it to leave
its territorial sea with immediate effect.

The contiguous zone is the area 24 nautical miles from the baseline. In this zone, the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of a coastal state apply.
Violations of these laws would require punishment by the coastal state.

UNCLOS states the areas beyond and adjacent to the territorial seas as the Exclusive
Economic Zone. In this zone, the rights of coastal and other states are governed by
the provisions of the Convention. The EEZ is not to exceed 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Also. In this
zone, the coastal state has the sovereign right to exploit, conserve and manage the
natural resources of the water. The economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone are also allowed. Other states may enjoy the use of the zone for navigation,
overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea.

The Maritime Zones of the Code are different from that of the UNCLOS with some
similarities. The Yaoundé Architecture consist of two Regional Maritime Centres,
CRESMAO and CRESMAC. To ensure effective oversight of the maritime space of
these regions their maritime space has been divided into zones. These zones are
known as the Maritime Zones of the Architecture. The Maritime Zones of the
Yaoundé Architecture are made up of the maritime space of several coastal states
that are signatories to the Code. This includes the territorial sea, contiguous zone and
EEZs of all the coastal states. Implementation of the Code does not require the
coastal states and other states from going contrary to the provisions made in

31

UNCLOS as stated in several articles of the Code. It can therefore be stated that the
Maritime Zones in UNCLOS are embedded in or a subset of that of the Architecture,
and the laws that govern the Maritime Zones of UNCLOS are also adhered to by
Maritime Zones of the Architecture.

After establishing the difference, the responsibilities of Maritime Centres cannot be
overlooked.

4.4 Responsibilities and Objectives of Maritime Centres

Through the Architecture several organizations have been created to network and
coordinate. The various levels of the Architecture have roles to play to ensure the
effective implementation of the Code (Yücel, 2021). The duties of the various
organizations are as elaborated below.

The role of the ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC at the political level is to provide
political oversight of the Regional Maritime Centres in the GoG region (Danso &
Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The maritime safety and security structure which was inspired by the Code includes
the ICC (Luntumbue, 2016). The ICC upon its establishment had the mandate to
enhance coordination, cooperation and systems interoperability between the Central
and West Africa maritime space. This means the ICC is an intersection for the
political, strategic and operational levels of maritime safety and security in the GoG
(Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The ICC is the body responsible for the coordination and acts as a junction for the
CRESMAC and CRESMAO in Pointe-Noire and Abidjan respectively (Luntumbue,
2016). The work of Maritime Zones and signatory states are supported and
coordinated by the ICC. In addition to these, the body is in charge of ensuring GoG’s
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momentum by engaging international and national governments to build political
will to support the course (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The ICC’s role in the
coordination and cooperation of CRESMAC and CRESMAO is by standardization
and harmonization through education, training and standard operating procedures
(Yücel, 2021).

The duties of the two Regional Centres, CRESMAC and CRESMAO include the
political oversight of the economic communities by creating and maintaining
standard operating procedures (Yücel, 2021). Overseeing and coordinating the
activities and operations of the MMCCs at the multinational level in their respective
regions form part of their responsibility (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The MMCCs coordinate the activities and operations of the focal points. The day-today operations of focal points and their undertakings with the rest of the Yaoundé
Architecture are also the responsibility of the MMCCs (Yücel, 2021).

The duties of the MOCs include the mobilization of main governmental stakeholders
of the state action at sea. These include the national navies, customs, fisheries,
maritime police and environmental protection agency. The MOCs communicate
whatever is received and effectively respond to any alert from other Maritime
Centres, hence the need to establish focal points with the necessary capacity
designated for such duty (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The focal points are for
effective and timely information sharing and flow among states. The Architecture is
linked to nations through the focal points which are mostly the MOCs (Yücel, 2021).

From the above-mentioned roles, it can be said that the Maritime Centres have
unclear responsibilities. Their roles are not properly defined and also overlap. The
structure of the Yaoundé Architecture is a network of independent actors with
common problems. Strengthening the Architecture means organizational and
individual bonds should be increased and intensified. The Yaoundé Architecture
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when considered as a network of signatory states fighting a common goal, would
help to improve the Yaoundé Architecture structure and realize the need for an
expansion of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct mandate. The review of the Yaoundé
Architecture would be followed with the methodology used to conduct the entire
research.
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Chapter 5. Research Methodology
The nature of a problem will determine a justifiable methodology that a researcher
must adopt. To draw meaningful deductions from research, the data collected,
usually in its raw state, is a determining factor in the conclusions made after a
thorough analysis (Opoku et al, 2016). This chapter presents the research design,
methods adopted, data collection and analysis process, sampling participant selection
process and the ethical principles that needed to be adhered to.
5.1 Research Design and Method
The study employed a qualitative research methodology. The qualitative research
method receives first-hand information which is centred on the views of participants.
The use of this method permits the ability to hunt for numerous realities and provide
a complete understanding of the study (Hilal & Alabri, 2013). The qualitative
method used was specifically semi-structured interviews.
A semi-structured interview allows the question ‘Why?’ to be asked, making it a
suitable method (Miles & Gilbert, 2005). The researcher can probe participants for
more information. The questions can be modified to address important areas of the
study and allow participants to provide a better understanding of the topic (Gray,
2013). The method permits the researcher to participate in a dialogue with the
participant since a specific pattern is not followed (May, 2011).

The interview was designed to comprise naval officers, shipping agents, and the
International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-INTERPOL) officers, but the
Maritime Centres currently are manned by naval officers who are the main players in
the implementation of the Code. A total of ten naval officers from the different
Maritime Centres across the region were presented with guided questions about the
maritime capabilities of Maritime Centres in the GoG. The other possible
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participants as stated above were difficult to reach hence resorting to only naval
officers. How the researcher selected participants are discussed next.

5.2 Sampling and Selection of Participant
The right participants for qualitative research include persons with experience in the
field under study (Morse, 2010). In selecting participants, the researcher located
participants with the potential to provide information in the area of study. For
example, naval officers who have worked in the Maritime Centres since they were
established.

The researcher approached participants from diverse countries in the GoG using her
contacts. These participants provided valuable insight regarding all the progressive
implementations made by the Yaoundé Architecture during the data collection stage.

5.3 Data Collection
The data collection process which was mainly through interviews started in May
2022 and ended in August 2022 with ten participants from twenty expected
respondents. The interview sessions took approximately one hour for each
participant. The researcher conducted these interviews using online platforms such as
zoom and WhatsApp video calls. Each interview was conducted between the
researcher and the participant alone without any other person present.

The interview consists of questions on the incorporation of the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct into national legislation, the contribution of Maritime Centres to the
implementation of the Code, the resources and capabilities of Maritime Centres, the
achievements of the Code and the Architecture and the challenges encountered in the
implementation of the Code. Participants discussed the topics extensively.
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Further questions got participants to discuss the external support provided by
stakeholders, the achievements made by the Code and the challenges faced in its
implementation. Respondents also provided some recommendations to help improve
the level of implementation of the Code of Conduct and the Architecture. Appendix
A provides a sample of the semi-structured interview questions.

The researcher made a conscious effort to follow the order of questions and only
deviated when it was needed to help the flow of the discussion. Follow-up questions
were also asked to get more clarification on the issues and get more data about the
study. The semi-structured interview questions were appropriate for this study. The
choice of approach allowed the researcher to overcome the challenges posed by the
lack of scholarly peer-reviewed articles on the topic and the culture of secrecy
surrounding the topic. The data analysis process would be considered after the
collection phase as appropriate.

5.4 Data Analysis
The data used for the research is purely qualitative as mentioned earlier. Qualitative
data analysis deals with gathering, structuring and interpreting qualitative data to
comprehend its broad representation (Aspers & Corte, 2019). Generally, text, such as
open-ended responses to surveys, in this case, semi-structured interview questions
formed the qualitative data. When a researcher conducts a study, the need to
understand people’s opinion or explain changes in metrics rely on qualitative data
(Collins & Stockton, 2018). Compared to quantitative data which captures structured
information, qualitative data is unstructured and has more depth to formulate
hypotheses, answer critical questions and build understanding.

Because of the relatively small number of interviews and the researcher wanting to
get more familiar with the data gathered, manual analysis was chosen. Even though it
was time-consuming, it facilitated the researcher to grasp and get a deeper insight
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into the collected data. The data analysis process happened according to the
following steps:
1. Gathering and collecting qualitative data
2. Organising qualitative data
3. Coding
4. Analysing the qualitative data for insights
5. Reporting on the insights derived from the analysis
The codes generated for the analysis were; logistics, financial resources, human
resources, political willingness, implementation, coordination and cooperation.
Narrative analysis of qualitative data was employed and deep insight into specific
issues was achieved.

Ethical considerations for data collection and analysis were considered as explained
below.

5.5 Research Ethics
Ethical clearance was sought from the research ethics committee at the World
Maritime University to involve human subjects in the research. A mail was sent and
the appropriate response was given in April 2022. Appendix B provides copies of the
WMU REC protocol form, participant consent form and the approval mail received.

The information obtained came under strict adherence to confidentiality because of
the level of security. No identifying information on the participants was made except
in cases where the participants allowed it and the analysis posed no adverse effect on
any entity. The data collected was solely used for the research and after grading the
research, the data would be deleted. Limitations existed during the research. An
elaboration is done on it since it is essential for the study.
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5.6 Limitations
A major limitation to obtaining data in this research was the availability of sensitive
personnel to respond to the questions. The number of participants got smaller and
smaller because the Maritime Centres currently do not have a centralised system that
could point a researcher in the direction of the people who are known to answer
directly what the researcher sort.

Therefore, the obtained data originated from the few who first agreed to respond and
followed through on their promise. This makes the data look scanty especially when
the researcher would have wished the same questions could be responded to by
officials from all levels of the Yaoundé Architecture. However, this did not discredit
the data obtained as valuable deductions and analyses were made from it.

Discussion of the analysis made using the method employed follows next in chapters
six and seven.
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Chapter 6. Capabilities of Maritime Centres in the Yaoundé
Architecture
After the discussion of the method for collecting data in the previous chapter, this
chapter looks at the capabilities of Maritime Centres in the Yaoundé Architecture for
implementing the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The discussion would be done using
articles and supported by interview outcomes.

Dealing with maritime insecurity is essentially enforcing the laws at sea. The naval
forces of most coastal states in the GoG intervene to defend the sea against maritime
crimes (Hassan & Hasan, 2017). The operation of Maritime Centres in the GoG is an
important initiative for maritime security in the region. Maritime Centres are
important developments because, over the years, it has been a challenge for states in
the GoG to prevent, monitor, track and respond to maritime insecurity issues
collectively. Equipping the Maritime Centres would get them to easily develop their
maritime situational or domain awareness and be able to effectively monitor and
interdict maritime crimes in the waters (Walker, 2015).

The Yaoundé Architecture does not deal with the capacity and capabilities of the
states. Signatory states are responsible for enforcing their maritime capabilities
(Yücel, 2021). Generally, states lack the assets and requisite capabilities to secure
their long coastlines and vast waters and this has hampered their ability to keep pace
with maritime crime. This challenge and the rate of growth and complexity of
maritime crimes have attracted national and international stakeholders to take up
some responsibilities at various levels to help in the response to maritime insecurity
in the region. The cooperation among these stakeholders and states is mostly through
the Yaoundé Protocol framework (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The following
sections will discuss the logistics, financial, and human resources available in the
Maritime Centers and the willingness of state parties to the Yaoundé Code to build
the capacity of the Maritime Centres.
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6.1 Logistics
Logistics are part of the main resources required for an organization to effectively
achieve results. The need for the required resources in an organization cannot be
ruled out when success needs to be achieved. Maritime Centres of the Yaoundé
Architecture are considered organizations and for their success in operations, there is
a need for them to be equipped with the necessary resources.

The ECCAS ensured operations by establishing structures based in Pointe-Noire
(Republic of the Congo). ECOWAS equally provided structures aside from the
CRESMAO headquarters which was delayed but has been officially made available
since March 2022. Other Maritime Centres are faced with delays in structures and
logistics. The delays are mainly due to a lack of sufficient resources and a lack of
long-term funding mechanisms (Luntumbue, 2016).

Coastguards and navies in the region are the main stakeholders in the implementation
of the Code, however, most of them lack the necessary platforms due to financial
constraints. Their lack of intervention capabilities is a resource problem that needs
attention (Günther, 2015).

Member States are the main source for the provision of platforms to Maritime
Centres in operations related to the implementation of the Code. The provision of
utilities is also done by the same signatories, especially the host country. However,
the Code does not state the exact quantum that is to be provided by signatories. The
Maritime Centres are also not equipped with resources for them to take up operations
without consulting signatories. An officer expressed,
“Host countries contribute to the Centres by providing the needed utilities. All
signatories are required to support with logistics but there is no clarity on who is to
provide what for the Centres. The Centres do not also have a pool of resources from
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various states for operations, they rely on signatories to make available platforms
for operations”

It is noticeable that, after the establishment of the Maritime Centres, some as far as
2018, the equipment provided by either ECOWAS and ECCAS, is the only
equipment provided officially to the Centres to date. However, some institutions
such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Korean
Embassy and others support Maritime Centres with logistics for their operations. A
respondent lamented,
“Since the establishment of the Maritime Centre in 2018, the logistics provided by
ECOWAS have been the only logistics provided by them. The Centre is challenged
with logistics. Some organizations and country embassies such as UNODC, US and
Denmark have supported the Centre with some logistics and that has aided in
operations”

6.2 Financial Resources
Funding for capabilities and platforms is very necessary when it comes to offering a
credible response to maritime insecurity issues. Even with having sufficient
knowledge about the situation in the maritime space and not having the needed
resources and funds to respond to the situation, there would not be an advantage for
the maritime domain or situational awareness developed (Walker, 2015). Financial
burden required to make the Code a success should not be underestimated, if
possible, international support needs to be attained (Günther, 2015).

The Maritime Centres are ECOWAS and ECCAS- funded Centres; hence, the
provision of grants for their daily upkeep and operations is their responsibility to
ensure smooth operation. Most of the respondents believe finance is an issue for the
Centres because nothing is stated in the Code about the financing and allowance of
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staff. The responsibility has since been with the signatories and they decide what to
do about the situation. A staff asserts;
“The Centre is facing financial problems. The Code states nothing about the finance
of the Centres and the allowance of staff. The allowances for the local staff seconded
to the Centre are to be provided by the signatory, but since the establishment of the
Centre, nothing has been done in that regard”

The resources provided to the Maritime Centres require financial ability to manage
them. The ECOWAS and ECCAS provide grants to the Centres for daily operations,
however, these grants are not consistent. Some partners and institutions have been
supportive in the provision of financial assistance knowing that the Maritime Centres
do not have a laid down budget, however, the support from others is no more
forthcoming. As stated by an officer;
“Grants are provided to the Centres by either ECOWAS or ECCAS for daily
operations. These grants are mostly either delayed or not granted at all. This
problem is mainly an ECOWAS issue. The ECCAS region has found a way around
the issue. Some institutions supported the Centre initially, but for some time now, it
has seized since they felt it was not their responsibility”

6.3 Human Resources
Humans are a major resource for every organization. The human element has several
complexities due to human-related activities, nonetheless, their involvement in
institutions facilitates operations and gets things done. The Maritime Centres require
staff to manage the day-to-day activities of the Centres and ensure better
coordination and cooperation as required in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Centres
require multinational staff as the Centres oversee the maritime domain of several
signatories of the Code.
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Multinational staff help to enhance transnational cooperation, since officers from
different countries would be working together, and understand the network. A social
bond would be created and that would be helpful in information sharing. The lack of
multinational staff means fewer human resources and national representatives are
limited (Yücel, 2021).

Signatories to the Code have a commitment of human resources to the Centres. The
staff to the Centres are agreed upon among signatories and each signatory has
appointment positions for staff. The Centre after its establishment is to be staffed by
the host nation until foreign staff occupy various appointments in the Centres. This
has been a challenge since some Centres still have only staff from the host country.

The multinational staff required for most of the Maritime Centres are not available.
This is likely due to a lack of finance. ICC is not fully staffed due to political issues
with the regional economic communities (Yücel, 2021). A respondent relates;
“Signatories have an agreed number of personnel to contribute to the Centres with
an assigned position. Contribution to staffing the Centre is not the same for all
signatories. It is assigned considering the size of the country, the size of its navy or
coastguard and also based on the resources of the country. At least two personnel
are expected to report to various Maritime Centres from various countries. As it
stands now, MMCC Zone E has all personnel reporting to the Centre but MMCC
Zone F has only personnel from the host country operating the Centre”

The non-availability of multinational staff in the various Centres may be attributed to
the lack of financial capability of host countries. The allowances that are to be paid
to these staff and what to make their stay comfortable to ensure efficiency is not
properly defined. This is challenging for several states and has caused Centres to be
operated by only one state denying the benefits of having multinational staff in the
Centres. This was explained by an officer;
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“The staff of the Centres are to move from diverse countries to the various Maritime
Centres. They are to be provided with allowances and good living conditions,
however, this is difficult for some countries because they do not have the financial
capability to take up the cost. This is one of the reasons why staff from other states
have not reported to their Centres. They need the allowances to motivate them to
work better to achieve results”

6.4 Willingness of Signatories in Building Capacities for Maritime Centres
Signatories are the major stakeholders of the Yaoundé Architecture and the
Architecture can succeed when the signatories support it greatly. According to Danso
& Allotey-Pappoe (2021), Signatories have the maritime space and capacity to
achieve the objectives of the Yaoundé Architecture, however, the capabilities of
these signatories differ. Some are endowed with platforms while others lack them
woefully (Yücel, 2021). Some coastal states in the GoG lack the willingness to fight
maritime insecurity. This may be due to the lack of political will or the low number
of insecurity issues in their territorial waters and offshore assets (Günther, 2015).

Additionally, Signatories are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty and that
limits the Yaoundé Architecture. The non-binding nature of Article 19, the limit of
hot pursuit in territorial waters; Article 9 and Article 2 are too considerate of states’
unwillingness to hand over sovereignty to the transnational structure, the Yaoundé
Architecture. This indicates that the Architecture has no forces, assets, platforms or
capabilities on its own. Signatories are not willing and some cannot provide these
capabilities to the Yaoundé Architecture (Yücel, 2021).

Operational capacities of countries in the GoG vary and dealing with the issues of the
GoG would require cooperation in their surveillance, enforcement and response to
the issues (Orellana, 2019). The ability to have joint operations would help to an
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extent solve the issue of capacity. It would help bridge the gap of difference in the
capabilities and sophistication of equipment (Walker, 2015).

The limitation of resources in the states of the GoG has caused a limitation in the
distance they can go for patrols and how effective they can respond to insecurity
issues in the region (Orellana, 2019). Some states in the GoG have however
increased their coastal surveillance capabilities to an extent with the assistance of the
United States and the European Union (Orellana, 2019). Sustained surveillance and
security in the GoG require unity and that is lacking, hence the weakness of the
navies in enforcement and which is doing little to prevent maritime insecurity in the
region (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

The lack of capacity has made it difficult for states to patrol their maritime space.
Most navies in the region are limited in maritime capacity and are ineffective in
ensuring maritime security. Resorting to an international capacity building would
address the issue of capabilities by a large margin. Also, encouragement of joint
operations and information-sharing amongst state navies and coastguards would help
get the states to deploy their scarce resources effectively to ensure a safe and secured
maritime space in the GoG. With the resources and willingness of states mentioned,
there is the need to validate the effectiveness of the Maritime Centres.
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Chapter 7. The Effectiveness of Maritime Centres in Yaoundé Code
of Conduct Implementation
7.1 Coordination and Cooperation in the Yaoundé Architecture
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct emphasizes the coordination and cooperation of
signatories for a safe and secured maritime space in the GoG. Coordination and
cooperation mainly rely on information sharing and conducting operations together.
The Code seeks how information about maritime insecurity can be effectively shared
freely and properly to ensure coordination, cooperation and bringing together of
resources to deal with maritime insecurity. According to Danso & Allotey-Pappoe
(2021), information sharing is the bedrock of the whole Architecture and the Code,
hence, states and stakeholders of the maritime domain should be willing to share
information to ensure its effectiveness.
The Yaoundé Architecture ensures information sharing from the bottom to the top of
the structure. Information usually moves from MOCs of coastal states through the
zonal level to the regional level and then to the international level. Also, information
is shared with several stakeholders in the maritime domain and those with an interest
in the domain. Information sharing is mostly done using emails. The sea vision
system, telegram and Very High-Frequency channels are also used.
Signatories and stakeholders are reluctant to share information. The Reluctance in
information sharing amongst states may be attributed to signatories trying to protect
their sovereignty and commercial shipping companies, vessels and other stakeholders
lacking trust in the Maritime Centres. Also, UNCLOS Article 302 gives grounds to
states to avoid the disclosure of information and that hampers the encouragement of
information sharing in the GoG (Walker, 2015).
Stakeholders lacking confidence in the information sharing process, stating there was
a lack of security for information being shared facilitated the development of an
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information sharing platform known as the Yaoundé Architecture Regional
Information System (YARIS) by the Architecture. The system is meant to ensure and
provide secured information sharing amongst maritime actors. It is also to ensure
better coordination between Maritime Centres. With YARIS, information can be
shared with all stakeholders on a need-to-know basis. Information retrieved by
Maritime Centres can be displayed and allows for analysis of the occurrence of
incidents.
A respondent commented on information sharing;
“Information is shared between the coastal states, MMCCs, and all Maritime
Centres at the zonal and regional levels. Information is also shared with several
stakeholders such as shipping companies, fisheries commission, port authorities,
maritime administration, oil companies and some embassies with their vessels in the
GoG. It is to help them ensure safe and secured shipping through the waters.
Contacts have been provided for vessels to call in case of any incident, however, they
do not contact Maritime Centres directly but rather resort to calling Maritime
Domain Awareness for Trade- GoG (MDAT-GoG) who then relays such information
to the Centres”

Another state that;
“Coordination and cooperation happen mainly between MMCCs as the Code
suggests, however, it is limited due to the lack of resources of these MMCCs. After
the MMCCs coordinate to deal with an insecurity issue, they rely on signatories to
assist with platforms to execute the task. Some signatories lack the needed platforms
hence coordination is unexploited. Also, the Information sharing process is not very
effective and the YARIS system has been developed to help in the safe and secured
sharing of information. The system is still under development and all stakeholders
are being trained to use the system effectively”
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Coordination includes joint operations; joint operations would get signatories to
coordinate their resources to fight insecurity in their maritime space. Signatories
through the Maritime Centres have signed up MoUs to join their resources together
to undertake joint patrols and operations in the GoG to reduce the rate of insecurity
issues in the region. The MoUs are to ensure that, countries with weak platforms
meet up with countries that are relatively strong in platforms to merge up their
resources, capabilities and platforms to protect their maritime domain. An officer
explains;
“Coordination and cooperation as the Code suggests are the appropriate means to
tackle insecurity in our waters. Due to the differences in the level and state of
resources of signatory navies in the region, undertaking joint operations would help
bridge the gap in resources and ensure effective patrols on the waters for a secure
maritime space. Signatories of Zones E and F have signed up MoUs for joint patrols
and operations. For Zone E, the signing was done in 2018 and was made operational
in 2021. A joint operation was conducted and all signatories contributed greatly.
Each signatory made available a ship for the operation and it was a success”
Okafor-Yarwood et al (2020), state the promising nature of the Architecture’s
instrument in international cooperation. It however mentioned the challenge as the
political will of signatories to champion it. Kamal-Deen (2014) confirms the political
authority of the framework and the degree of the sovereignty of signatories as the
challenge and that, the effectiveness of transnational cooperation depends on
sufficient political authority.

About 70% of respondents confirmed coordination has been good so far within the
Architecture but with some hitches in information sharing. They believe the reason
for having staff from all member states is to allow easy access to information from
the states. However, this is for now defeated as multinational staff have not reported
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to Maritime Centres and getting information from states is difficult. Better
coordination and cooperation yield achievements as elaborated in the next paragraph.

7.2 Achievements

of

the

Yaoundé

Code

of

Conduct

and

Level

of

Implementation

The Yaoundé Code is not an idea on paper but works with results on the waters in
the region. The Code has seen many achievements since its implementation. Several
improvements in the maritime space of the GoG region can be attributed to the Code.
Cameroon 2013 lead to the establishment of the regional frameworks (CRESMAO
and CRESMAC). The establishment of the CRESMAC was one of the first steps
taken for the successful implementation of the Code, after which other structures of
the Architecture followed (Günther, 2015).
The Code of Conduct formed the basis of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime
Strategy (EIMS) and also the maritime strategy for the ECCAS region. The EIMS
made provision for the establishment of the Maritime Centres in the region. Also,
signatories are requested to develop national strategies and incorporate the EIMS
which has the Code incorporated into their strategy. Some countries such as Ghana,
Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and others have developed their national strategies and are
implementing them hence the implementation of the Code of Conduct.
Additionally, signatories have been encouraged to incorporate the Code into their
national laws and criminalize crimes such as piracy. Most states in the GoG lacked
anti-piracy laws and even though most still lack the law in their national laws, some
countries such as Nigeria and Togo have laws for the prosecution of pirates and that
is a great achievement.
Even though maritime insecurity issues were dealt with through the collaboration of
countries in the GoG before the Code, the Architecture through the Code has
reinforced and broadened the extent to which cooperation can be carried out.
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MMCCs have taken up the coordination role and are removing the gaps that existed
between the states of the region to help deal with the insecurity issue in the region
effectively. Also, Coastal states of the region are putting together their resources to
conduct joint operations. Maritime Domain Awareness on general maritime issues
and how they can be dealt with is being achieved, not forgetting the avenue created
for foreign naval vessels to offer assistance and distress vessels calling in for
assistance. A respondent summarized the achievement as;

“The Yaoundé Code of Conduct has made some achievements since its adoption. The
level of cooperation amongst member states is improving. The cooperation now
between member states is better than before. The global strategy that was signed by
the head of states at Yaoundé was to have the regional economic bodies develop
their strategies to incorporate the global strategy. ECOWAS developed the ECOWAS
Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) and ECCAS also has its maritime strategy.
These strategies integrated all the requirements from the global strategy and also
from the Code. Before the adaptation of the Code in 2013, there existed insecurity
issues in our waters and countries collaborated to deal with the issue. However, the
Architecture has ensured and widened the horizon to which this cooperation can be
done”
“Cooperation between states before the Architecture was not strong. But currently,
the coordination and cooperation between the states are more cordial. The
Architecture has also helped states to pull resources together in the conducting of
operations together. Various zones have their states conducting operations together
in their maritime space. It has raised the awareness to understand what the maritime
domain can offer, what the challenges are and how collectively, these challenges can
be addressed. A lot of foreign naval vessels are coming in within the framework of
the architecture to offer assistance. They still have bilateral relations with coastal
states, but this time around, a focal point is available to coordinate the activities of
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the states and the foreign countries. A central point has also been made available for
distress vessels to call for assistance”

Other achievements of the Code include the launching of the GoG Declaration on
Suppression of Piracy on 31 May 2021, which has helped to reduce the number of
pirate attacks and kidnappings in the GoG. It is expected that, in 2023, pirate attacks
would decrease by 80%. Measures that were taken resulting in the reduction of
attacks include; The enforcement of maritime laws by international navies in
international waters of the GoG, the Nigeria Navy clampdown on pirate camps,
several meeting held between the ICC and Nigeria under the GoG Maritime
Coordination Forum, Shared Awareness and Deconfliction and increased number of
Security Escort Vessels cooperation between the Nigeria Navy and commercial
shipping (Baltic & Integrated Maritime Council [BIMCO], 2022).

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct can be said to be achieving its intended purpose since
its implementation as illustrated by an officer;
“The purpose of the Code is being achieved at the moment. This is because the Code
has stated some requirements such as the incorporation into national laws,
criminalizing piracy and other crimes into national laws, developing national
strategies etc. Also, it states that states are to take charge of their maritime domain
and secure it and share information between IMO bodies and regional bodies etc.
The Regional Centres are in charge of the implementation of the strategies set by the
economic bodies. ECOWAS is implementing the EIMS while CRESMAC is also in
charge of the implementation of their strategy. CRESMAO encourages their
signatories to sign MoUs between themselves for joint patrols and operations in their
various zones. These requirements are being carried out by states in one way or the
other in their national laws and this means that the Code is in a way achieving its
purpose to an extent”
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These achievements are mainly based on the involvement of stakeholders and the
support of signatory states. Some of their relationships are as follows.

7.3 Relationship between Signatories and Other Stakeholders
The achievements of the Code involve the support gained from stakeholders.
International actors such as the UN regional offices for West and Central Africa,
UNODC, IMO, Donor countries and international entities have assisted the
Architecture in the effective implementation of the Code. The assistance provided
includes training, technical assistance and capacity building. Capacity building
includes the training of national navies, facilitation of exercises and provision of
equipment to improve the state of capacities of navies and Maritime Centres. The
UNODC especially has been very helpful in the provision of assistance to the
Maritime Centres. They have contributed to training law enforcement agencies
through their Global Maritime Crime Programme and that has helped in the
apprehension and prosecution of crime (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).
The IMO has also contributed greatly by adopting Resolution A.1069 (28) on the
Prevention and Suppression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit
Maritime Activities in the GoG. Also, cooperation with international and regional
partners to help tackle the issue is encouraged. Governments have also been inspired
to contribute financially to the trust fund of West and Central Africa maritime
security to build national and regional capabilities.
The EU supports by providing security capacity building. The US, Germany and
France are also providing support in the training of national navies and providing
equipment as well as capacity-building programmes (Husted, 2019). The Danish is a
critical partner with the GoG states. They have since 2015 led the GoG Inter-regional
network (GoGIN) in supporting the Yaoundé Process. They have promoted the blue
economy in the GoG by securing the seas of the region. They have also increased
their support to the GoG over the increase in piracy in the region since 2019
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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2019). The Danish have funded programs
to enhance regional maritime security through the assistance of maritime and law
enforcement institutions at both national and regional levels. Their partnerships with
the UNODC, IMO, Danish Defense and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Centre (KAIPTC) have strengthened maritime response in the region
(Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).
A staff highlighted that;
“Maritime Centres have gained support from several countries and organizations.
UNODC has supported Zones E and F in terms of equipment and the conduction of
operations. The German Government has also supported MMCC zones E, F and D
with about 70% of the equipment in the Centres. Training has also been conducted
for personnel. Capacity building support from the UK through their high
commission. The US in the initial stages provided the sea vision system to conduct
and ensure better surveillance of the maritime space. Other countries such as Korea
and France are also contributing to ensure that the Code is being implemented
successfully”

Due to the weak capabilities of the states in the GoG, they rely on foreign
partnerships for assistance. Non-regional naval forces have been deployed in the
GoG to help combat the issue of maritime insecurity. The deployment by some states
focused on training and exercises and also protecting ships that fall within national
interest. The Italians, Danish and Russians have been more involved in dealing with
maritime insecurity issues in the region. The presence and activities of their warships
have been very instrumental in tackling piracy, especially in the GoG (BIMCO,
2022). This is supported by a respondent’s comment;
“The assistance provided by stakeholders does not end with training. Some states
have gone the extra mile to deploy their vessels in the maritime domain of the GoG.
Due to the lack of capabilities of most states in the region to get beyond their
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territorial seas to the EEZ, these vessels are deployed at the EEZ of most states to
take up security issues. They provide security for vessels by patrolling and surveying
the area. They are also able to chase the bad guys operating around that area. Also,
exercises are being conducted between the GoG states and the foreign naval vessels.
Exercises such as Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS organised by the US and
Exercise Africa Grand Nemo by France include the participation of signatories and
this has been instrumental in ensuring security in our maritime domain”

The support of stakeholders and foreign navies to the states of the GoG to combat
maritime crime has contributed to ensuring maritime security in the region. It has
helped in the capacity building of personnel and the adaptation of some good
practices. The participation of signatories in the joint exercises organized by the US
and France, EXERCISES OBANGAME EXPRESS and AFRICA GRAND NEMO
gets countries and the Architecture to exercise how to effectively coordinate and
cooperate in real-time situations. Also, training, communication and exercising on
the chain of information sharing and flow are undertaken during the exercise. These
exercises help to test the Yaoundé Architecture. Despite the achievements and
support from stakeholders, there exist some challenges which would be deliberated.

7.4 Challenges in the Implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct since its adoption and implementation has made
several achievements with the support of stakeholders but is yet to be considered
fully effective for its purpose. The Yaoundé Architecture has faced several
challenges in the implementation of the Code. The challenges range from
institutional, logistics and regional.

The main issue that challenges the implementation of the Code is the lack of funding,
logistics and capacity. The Maritime Centres lack the needed capacities to operate
effectively. Signatories that are to empower these Maritime Centres, some of which
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are burdened with funding joint maritime security operations and hence cannot
support Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code. Most of them also lack
the capacity and desire to cooperate. The lack of support for these Centres has
resulted in them relying on external donors. This is difficult to sustain and the
effective operations of the Maritime Centres are undermined (Danso & AlloteyPappoe, 2021). An officer explains;
“The Maritime Centres are faced with several challenges in the implementation of
the Code. The main challenge encountered is logistics constraints. The capabilities
needed for effective implementation of the Code by Centres are lacking. The
ECOWAS and ECCAS have tried to equip the Centres and other stakeholders have
also supported with logistics but it is still not adequate. Signatories are encouraged
to provide logistics but some of them cannot fund it. This has reduced the
effectiveness and the extent these Centres can go to implement the Code
successfully”

Also, the majority of the coastal states in the GoG lack effective legal powers to
prosecute most maritime crimes such as piracy. The absence of domestic laws to
prosecute these crimes is a challenge in the execution of the Code. Few states such as
Nigeria and Togo can prosecute piracy in their courts. This has ended in very few
prosecutions of maritime crime in the GoG (Yücel, 2021).

Some also have weak penalties to be applied when these crimes are prosecuted. With
this challenge, the efforts of the navies and coast guard to tackle the issue of
maritime insecurity and accomplish one of the aims of the Code is being jeopardized
(Orellana, 2019). This great challenge gets criminals to move from countries with
strict laws on the prosecution of crimes to those without and that still challenges the
entire GoG region (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). A staff emphasized;
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“Most of the signatories to the Code do not have the required legislature to
prosecute maritime crimes. Even though they are required to incorporate such laws
into their national laws, most of them are still reluctant and others are also going
through a hard time ensuring that, this is done. Only a few countries such as Nigeria
and Togo have criminalized some maritime crimes such as piracy in their national
laws and can prosecute such crimes in their courts. This challenges the
implementation of the Code as criminals will commit more crimes in waters of the
countries that cannot prosecute such crimes”
Additionally, the not binding nature of the code has signatories not fully adhering to
the guidelines the code provides. This challenges the kind of compliance that is
needed for effective maritime security (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The
Architecture is not providing the needed framework and does not compel signatories
to adopt these frameworks in their national laws (Yücel, 2021).

Furthermore, trust is lost by shipping companies and organizations. There exists a
challenge of stakeholders keeping information to themselves and refusing to share
such information. This challenges the ability of Maritime Centres to develop their
situational awareness and that would continue when stakeholders remain secretive
with such information. This happens because, states, shipping companies and
organizations fear interference with their safety of navigation and lack trust in the
maritime Centres (Walker, 2015).

They resort to sharing information with the MDAT-GOG. This organization is
located in Brest, France and Portsmouth, United Kingdom. Commercial vessels
resorting to this organization means a lack of trust in the authorities of GoG states
and their capabilities (Yücel, 2021). To ensure continual access to information to
ensure safe and secured maritime space, there is the need for the required resources,
capabilities and platforms to be acquired (Walker, 2015). Diverse languages of
signatories also hamper information sharing (Yücel, 2021). A respondent stated;
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“Coordination in the implementation of the Code has been fairly good, however,
some hitches in the retrieving of information and sharing of information are being
faced. Multinational staff is required in Maritime Centres to allow easy access to
information from various signatory states. With the lack of these staff, the Centres
find it difficult to get information from some states. The stakeholders of these states
are usually reluctant to provide information and that is a challenge. They attribute
this habit to the lack of trust in the Centres and do not know the reasons why such
information is being sorted for. Shipping companies also lack trust in the Centres
since they have the impression that these Centres will delay in responding to their
needs because they do not have the resources to do so. They resort to giving
information to MDAT-GoG since they trust their capabilities and believe they can be
relied on. The issue of trust needs to be broken and this can be done when Centres
are equipped properly with the needed resources”

The non-regional naval forces deployed in the GoG have also identified some
weaknesses that exist in managing maritime insecurity in the GoG. They include the
absence of agreements between coastal states and non-regional naval forces of
handing over criminals to the coastal states. This is because legal processes are
required and prison facilities of the coastal states are to meet the standards of
international human rights. Also, it is requested that non-regional navies keep coastal
states informed on any activity that involves law enforcement and since all these are
lacking, managing insecurity is difficult (BIMCO, 2022).

The Code would be implemented and accomplish its aim when signatories to the
code perform their duties as they are supposed to (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).
The Architecture through transnational cooperation would help combat maritime
crime since it provides the platform for seamless information sharing. There is the
potential for harmonization of anti-blue crime responses and also enabling joint
actions and patrols (Yücel, 2021). Much still needs to be done. The success of the
Code does not just rely on regional action between states in the Gulf but also on
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effective coordination between the two regional organizations ECCAS and
ECOWAS (Günther, 2015). The Yaoundé Code would be compared with the
Djibouti Code to aid in making recommendations.
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Chapter 8. Comparison of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with the
Djibouti Code of Conduct
The Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is what is referred to
as the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
Similarly, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which was modelled from the Djibouti
Code of Conduct in its full version is known as the “Code of Conduct Concerning
the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity
in West and Central Africa”.
Maritime transport is indispensable to ensure the movement of essential goods such
as food and energy as well as raw materials and manufactured goods globally. With
the globalisation of economies, more than 80% of world trade is carried by sea
(Bueger & Edmunds, 2017). The rapid economic growth of the Western and Eastern
blocs of the African continent and other parts of the world merits attention to the
security issues that linger at sea.
However, piracy has a long history, and piracy and illicit activities at sea are still
posing threats to the safe transport of goods and the safety of crew and mostly causes
higher operating cost. Distinctively, in the late 1990s and 2000s, there was an
appreciable surge of maritime security issues in the African blocs (Allen, 2017).
Against this backdrop, the Djibouti Code was formulated in 2009 and the Yaoundé
Code in 2013. Thus, the concept of these agreements is to combat piracy and sea
robbery

through

information

sharing,

capacity

building

and

cooperative

arrangements.

8.1 Similarities
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct and
consists of 14 articles out of 17 articles of the Djibouti Code. This indicates several
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similarities between the Codes. The most palpable similarity between the Yaoundé
Code and the Djibouti Code is that they are both geared towards making the
maritime space of the economically important regions of the African continent safe.
Both Codes contain prospects of the eventual calling of states to make the Code
binding to signatories, however, both Codes remain non-binding. In fairness, the
signatories to the Codes have agreed to cooperate, in manners consistent and legal
with international standards, in:
1. The examination, capture and indictment of people, who are sensibly
associated with having committed demonstrations of theft and armed robbery
against ships, including those actuating or deliberately working with such
demonstrations;
2. The ban and capture of suspect ships and property on board such ships;
3. The rescue of ships, people and property subject to theft and armed robbery
and the help of appropriate consideration, treatment and bringing home of
sailors, anglers, other shipboard faculty and travellers subject to such
demonstrations, especially the individuals who have been exposed to
savagery; and
4. The conduct of shared operations - both among signatory states and with
naval forces from nations outside the area, for example, choosing police or
other approved authorities to set out on watch boats or aeroplanes of another
signatory.
What's more, the Codes give a structure to correspondence, coordination and
collaboration.

8.2 Differences
Despite the similarities of the Codes, some differences exist. Regional coverage for
both codes will stand out as the major difference between the Yaoundé Code and
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Djibouti Code. Just as their similarities are geared towards making economic
activities via their seas safe, the differences are just as keen.
First, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct covers the West and Central African bloc while
the Djibouti Code of Conduct runs from South Africa through to Egypt engulfing the
nations on the horn of Africa. The Djibouti Code was an IMO initiative and was
officially issued as an IMO document. It focused initially on only piracy and armed
robbery until 2017 when it changed through the Jeddah amendment. The Jeddah
amendment adopted articles from the Yaoundé Code and amended the Djibouti Code
to include other illicit maritime crimes and training. The Yaoundé Code on the other
hand was an ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC initiative and did not only deal with
piracy and armed robbery against ships but adopted a multidimensional approach to
maritime security by dealing with a wide range of transnational organised crimes
(Egede, 2021).
The Yaoundé Code enjoins its members to seek empowerment and training from
foreign powers relative to the Djibouti Code which embraces capacity building of
states to increase their state of security. Training of coastal guards and staff from all
institutions directly involved was conducted as part of the framework of the Djibouti
agreement. Also, the IMO has a provision for their staff to train personnel and staff
in terms of capacity building. A regional training centre in Doraleh-Djibouti has also
been provided for further capacity building in the region. Direct foreign interference
like naval patrols from NATO helped in the effectiveness of the Djibouti Code
(Menzel, 2018).
Lastly, the Djibouti Code incorporates nations of non-African origin. Yemen, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are all signatories to the
Djibouti Code whereas only nations from West and Central Africa signed up to the
Yaoundé Code agreement. There exists the Djibouti Code of Conduct trust fund, a
multi-donor voluntary fund. The same cannot be said for the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct even though the IMO has intentions for that.
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Observably, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Djibouti Code of Conduct are all
meant to repress piracy and its related activities as much as possible. These diverging
points could be laid out as the differences there are to the Codes. After examining the
similariti.es and differences, how effective are they?

8.3 Effectiveness of Both Codes
Both the Djibouti and Yaoundé Code of Conduct has been effective since their
adoption, especially the Djibouti Code of Conduct. The rate of maritime insecurity in
the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa region, especially piracy has reduced to the
barest minimum and much can be attributed to the effective implementation of the
Djibouti Code of Conduct. The Codes have increased the rate of information sharing
amongst member states and Maritime Centres. Also, cooperation and coordination
have been encouraged and states in the regions of these Codes are facilitating the
agenda. This has assisted in the fight against maritime crimes. The Code has created
very strong platforms for partnerships amongst the signatories and international
stakeholders and that has gained support from these stakeholders in ensuring
maritime security.
Furthermore, despite the financial and political challenges being encountered by
signatories, their continuous commitment to the Codes, and their efforts in the
implementation have favoured the Codes. Their support has contributed immensely
to strengthening the efforts in place to ensure security in the regions.

The Djibouti Code and the Yaoundé Code are instrumental agreements in the Gulf of
Aden, Horn of Africa and the GoG regions. They have helped in combating maritime
crime and continue to ensure the rate of these crimes remains minimal in their
waters. States and Maritime Centres have been helpful in their implementation
despite the challenges they face. The Djibouti Code has gained many achievements
since the rate of piracy in the region is almost extinct. The Yaoundé Code is gaining
ground and much is being done through the Yaoundé Architecture to attain success.
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Some measures instituted by the signatories of the Djibouti Code may be adopted by
the signatories of the Yaoundé Code to attain the same heights as the Djibouti Code.
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Chapter 9. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation
The chapters discussed earlier presented evidence on the Yaoundé Code of Conduct,
the Yaoundé Architecture, the capabilities of Maritime Centres in the
implementation of the Yaoundé Code, the achievements of the Code, challenges
faced and finally compared the Yaoundé Code to the Djibouti Code of Conduct. This
chapter provides a summary of the study by stating some findings, concludes the
study and profess some recommendations.

9.1 Summary of Study
The key findings of the study are summarized as follows;
1. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct aims to ensure maritime security in the GoG
by creating a strong bond of cooperation and coordination amongst
signatories of the Code. The unrestricted sharing of information within the
Yaoundé Architecture where Maritime Centres exist is the main source of
coordination and cooperation.
2. Maritime Centres are the main implementers of the Yaoundé Code and
require the necessary equipment and resources both financial and human to
ensure effective implementation of the Code. These resources are being
provided by the ECOWAS, ECCAS, signatories and other stakeholders with
interest in the GoG region.
3. Signatories to the Code have been grouped into different Maritime Zones
with Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres. Signatories have the
responsibility to provide support to the Maritime Centres with human and
financial resources. The Maritime Centres rely on the capabilities of the
signatory navies to implement the Code.
4. Most Signatory states lack the needed capabilities and platforms to combat
maritime crime in the GoG. This affects Maritime Centres as they do not
have a pool of resources to operate on their own but rely on the states. The
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Maritime Centres lack the needed resources to effectively implement the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Even though they receive assistance from
stakeholders both in the region and internationally, there is still more to be
done in terms of capabilities.

9.2 Conclusion
This study was carried out to examine and discuss the capabilities of Maritime
Centres in the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in
West and Central Africa, The Yaoundé Code of Conduct. A discussion was made
about the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Architecture that implements it. Further
discussions on the capabilities of Maritime Centres, the achievements of the Code
and the challenges encountered by Maritime Centres in the Implementation of the
Code were carried out with evidence from interviews conducted. The analysis of the
outcomes from the interviews identified the limited resources and capabilities of
Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code.

The full implementation of the Yaoundé Code would mean its effectiveness. This is
possible when technical and financial matters are met. However, the implementation
of the Code is mainly hampered by the limited ability and capacity of signatories and
Maritime Centres. Signatories to the Code are faced with differences in capacity and
wealth and that is a challenge for effective implementation of the Code. Solving the
root cause of the problem such as bettering the economy and providing good
governance perspectives as well as the procurement of equipment, platforms and
better training would help effective implementation of the Code. The IMO’s intent of
implementing a trust fund for the Yaoundé Code of Conduct similar to the Djibouti
Code of Conduct is a great step toward solving the issue of diverse capacity and
wealth of signatories.
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9.3 Recommendation
The following recommendations are suggested from the study;
1. The ECOWAS, ECCAS AND GGC being at the political level of the
Architecture and signatories of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct should
consider making the code a binding document.
2. Signatories of the Yaoundé Code are encouraged to domesticate it into their
national laws and develop their national maritime strategies as required.
3. A system for funding the Maritime Centres should be developed by
ECOWAS and ECCAS. It should be consistent to enable smooth operations
of the Maritime Centres.
4. There is a need for the political and strategic level of Yaoundé Architecture
to enhance cooperation at all levels of the Architecture and place importance
on the need for trust. Also, states in the GoG region should develop and
support a culture of information-sharing. This would facilitate and strengthen
the cooperation of the states and encourage states to willingly share
information for better implementation of the Code.
5. Stakeholders of the GoG maritime domain should continue to assist Maritime
Centres to enable them to collect data, analyze them and share such
information in a trustworthy and transparent manner.
6. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct known as the maiden document for the
Yaoundé Architecture should be reviewed and amendments made by the
Architecture to incorporate modern trends being encountered. This may be
likened to the Jeddah amendments made to the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
7. Also, platforms and capabilities should be built for Maritime Centres to
bridge the gap between information sharing and the abilities of Maritime
Centres to respond. Additionally, signatories should endeavor to provide
Maritime Centres with the required staff to ensure the availability of the
multinational staff in Maritime Centres to facilitate information retrieving
and sharing.
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8. An evaluation of the Architecture should be conducted to review the
organograms of the various Maritime Centres and access their efficiency to
make the Architecture better.
9. The consideration of airpower to survey the maritime space is required and
very important. Pirates are going further deep offshore more than 200nm to
attack. The presence of air power would allow a quick location and patrol of
the area before a ship arrives for further action.
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